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I. One Example of a Fine-tuned Free Physical Parameter 
parameter actual value 
Mn (mass of the neutron) 939.57 MeV     
Mp (mass of the proton) 




If Mn had been 941, so that were Mn/Mp had been 1.003, there would be no stars, and 
therefore no heavy elements, and therefore no life anywhere in the universe. Note that 
Mn/Mp is a dimensionless parameter – any physicist anywhere in the universe would 
come up with the same ratio, regardless of the unit of measure for mass. 
 
II. How to Visualize Fine-Tuning: The Range Game 
 
The Range Game (The Price Is Right) Fine-tuning for Life of Mn/Mp 
possible car prices    possible values for Mn/Mp 
 
          
$25,000     1.004  
 
$24,000     1.003    life-permitting 
                        .004                window 
$23,000     1.002     
      actual car price   x  $22,394      actual value x 1.001375  
$22,000     1.001 
            
$21,000   winning 1.000 
         $1000    window     . 
$20,000     0.999       
          
 
III. Stating the Fine-Tuning Design Argument Formally 
 
Premise Constituents 
K = Many of the initial conditions and free parameters of a universe need to be just right 
(“fine-tuned”) in order for the development of life in that universe to be possible. 
E = Life is possible in our universe. 
D = A supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge exists. 
MU = There exist many other universes, with varying initial conditions and values for the 
free parameters. 
E’ = Some universe or other is fine-tuned for life. 
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The Fine-Tuning Design Argument (full Bayesian version) 
 (1) P(E|K & ~D) ≈ 0  
{translation: The probability that life is possible in our universe, given that life requires 
cosmic fine-tuning and there is no Designer, is virtually zero.} 
 (2) P(E|K & D) >> 0  
{translation: The probability that life is possible in our universe, given that life requires 
fine-tuning and there is a Designer, is quite high.} 
 (3) P(D|K) >> P(E|K & ~D)  
{translation: The probability that a Designer exists is much greater than the probability 
that life is possible in our universe given that life requires fine-tuning and there is not a 
Designer.} 
 So, (4) P(D|E & K) >> 0  
{translation: The probability that a Designer exists, given that life is possible in our 
universe and life requires fine-tuning, is very high.} 
 
IV: A Helpful Analogy to the Fine-Tuning Design Argument: The Poker Cheat 
Argument 
 (1) The probability that Manson deals himself three straight royal flushes, given 
that there is only one chance in 649,740 of getting a royal flush in a single fair deal and 
Manson is not a skilled poker cheater, is virtually zero. 
 (2) The probability that Manson deals himself three straight royal flushes, given 
that there is only one chance in 649,740 of getting a royal flush in a single fair deal and 
Manson is a skilled poker cheater, is quite high. 
 (3) The probability that Manson is a skilled poker cheater is much greater than the 
probability that Manson deals himself three straight royal flushes, given that there is only 
one chance in 649,740 of getting a royal flush in a single fair deal and Manson is not a 
skilled poker cheater. 
 So, (4) given that Manson deals himself three straight royal flushes and there is 
only one chance in 649,740 of getting a royal flush in a single fair deal, the probability 
that he is a skilled poker cheater is very high.  
 
V: The Multiverse Response to the Fine-Tuning Design Argument 
The Multiverse Hypothesis “screens off” the probabilistic support D lends to E. That is, if 
we suppose there are many other universes, the first premise of the Fine-Tuning Design 
Argument is no longer true; E no longer favors D over ~D. Instead, 
 (5) P(E|K & ~D & MU) = P(E|K & D & MU) 
{translation: The probability that life is possible in our universe, given that life requires 
fine-tuning, there is not a Designer, and there is a multiverse, is approximately equal to 
the probability that the universe is fine-tuned for life, given that life requires fine-tuning, 
there is a Designer, and there is a multiverse.} 
 
VI: A Helpful Analogy to the Multiverse Response to the Fine-Tuning Design 
Argument: The Multi-Deal Response to the Poker Cheat Argument 
If Manson has dealt quadrillions of poker hands, the probability goes up that some 
sequence within the quadrillions includes three straight royal flushes. 
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VII: The ‘This Universe’ Objection to the Multiverse Response to the Fine-Tuning 
Design Argument (Roger White) 
Suppose that 1% of all possible universes are life-permitting, that according to MU there 
are exactly 1,000 universes, and that there is no Designer. Then 
 (6) P(E|~D & ~MU & K) = 1%  
{translation: The probability that this universe we’re in is fine-tuned for life, given that 
there isn’t a Designer, there is only one universe, and 1% of possible universe are life-
permitting, is 1%.} But conditionalizing on the multiverse hypothesis doesn’t change 
anything, says White. 
 (7) P(E|~D & MU & K) = 1%  
{translation: The probability that this universe we’re in is fine-tuned for life, given that 
there isn’t a designer, there are 1000 universes, and 1% of possible universe are life-
permitting, is still 1% (because the existence of 999 other universes doesn’t make it any 
more likely that this one is fine-tuned).} It’s just not relevant that 
 (8) P(E'|~D & MU & K) = 1 - P(~E'|~D & MU & K) = 1 - (0.99)1000 = 99.99% 
{translation: The probability that some universe or other is fine-tuned for life, given that 
there isn’t a Designer, there are 1000 universes, and 1% of possible universe are life-
permitting, is well over 99%.} 
 
This illustrates that the equality expressed in (5) is false if we replace the left of (5) with 
the left of (8). 
 
VIII: A Helpful Analogy to the ‘This Universe’ Objection to the Multiverse 
Response to the Fine-Tuning Design Argument: The ‘This Game’ Objection to the 
Multi-Deal Response to the Poker Cheat Argument 
If you’re playing poker with Manson and he deals himself three straight royal flushes, his 
telling you that he’s dealt thousands of quadrillions of hands and that over that time he’s 
dealt himself three royal flushes in a row a bunch of times is not going to make you any 
less suspicious that he’s cheating now. It’s just not relevant that he’s dealt all those royal 
flushes on all those other occasions. You’ll still rightly be suspicious that he got three 
royal flushes in a row on this occasion. 
 
IX. Manson’s Two Criticisms of the ‘This Universe’ Objection to the Multiverse 
Response to the Fine-Tuning Design Argument: the ‘This Planet’ Objection and the 
‘Essential Properties’ Objection 
 (A) “Why is this universe fine-tuned?” is a bad question. I will give several 
analogies to support this claim. 
 First Analogy: suppose Neil deGrasse Tyson explains the fitness of the Earth for 
life by pointing to the recent discovery of a wealth of extra-solar planets. Given the vast 
number of galaxies in the universe, with each galaxy hosting a vast number of stars and 
each star orbited by quite a few planets, he claims that it is likely that somewhere or other 
in the universe there exists a planet with conditions that are just right for life to develop 
on it. He isn’t explaining why this planet is fit for life. Instead, he is changing the 
question to a more sensible one.   
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 Second Analogy: On hearing news reports that a lone family in a remote 
Armenian village survived a devastating earthquake in December 1988 (nearly 50,000 
Armenians were killed by that earthquake), a friend of mine said at the time "It's a 
miracle." When I noted that, given the size of the area, it wasn't unlikely that some family 
occupied a protected position in a fortified cellar at the time of the quake, she replied 
"Well, it's a miracle that they survived." When I retorted that this was (from her point of 
view) equivalent to saying "Well, it's a miracle that the survivors survived" and that there 
was nothing the least surprising about that, she called me a bad name. But I was right. 
 Third Analogy: Roy Cockrum of Tennessee won $259,800,000 in Powerball on 
June 11, 2014. What’s the explanation of that fact? Well, tens of millions of people 
bought tickets and the odds were some person would win eventually. Once announced, 
the winner gains notoriety for being a new multi-millionaire. Asking “Why was it Roy 
Cockrum of Tennessee who won Powerball?” is not a reasonable question. That’s 
because there’s nothing special about Roy Cockrum of Tennessee – nothing that picks 
him out for us – besides the fact that he won Powerball.  
 (B) White’s objection rests on the metaphysical assumption that, according to the 
multiverse hypothesis, the values taken by the free parameters of a universe are not 
among its essential properties – that is, that this very universe could have taken a 
different set of values for its free parameters. White’s objection just assumes that, for 
example, this very universe could have had a neutron/proton mass ratio three times what 
it actually is.  
 Alvin Plantinga says there is no reason to deny this: “there is certainly no reason 
at all to think that if there are many universes, they will have essentially the property of 
displaying the values, for those parameters, that they do in fact display” (Where the 
Conflict Really Lies, p. 218). The reason Plantinga gives, however, is pure armchair 
intuition (p. 217): “Aren’t there possible worlds that are just like the actual world except 
the law of gravity isn’t inversely proportional to r2, but to r2.0……..01? Isn’t it possible in 
the broadly logical sense that you and I (more exactly, our bodies) should have existed 
even if the law of gravity had been different in that minute way? It certainly seems so.” 
 My response: the physicists who have developed multiverse theories are saying 
there is a hitherto-unknown natural kind: universes. If philosophers want to speak in an 
informed way about the properties of this new natural kind (rather than just opine from 
their armchairs), they really should ask the physicists. Here is an analogy: if you are 
asked to judge whether an human embryo is a human life, you really should come to 
know the science regarding embryos, fetal development, and so on. Of course, that 
information might not settle the issue of when human life begins (you might need 
additional philosophical principles to do that). But you need to know the science 
regarding embryos, fetal development, and so on to make an informed judgment. 
Likewise for universes. 
 Alas, the physicists don’t have a lot of time for metaphysics. They have simply 
not addressed the metaphysical issue of the essential and accidental properties of this new 
natural kind. Maybe that is because no one has ever asked them. That is why I am making 
a foray into “experimental philosophy.” I am distributing to over a hundred cosmologists 
a survey to uncover their views on the metaphysics of multiple universes. 
 
X. Manson’s Survey of Cosmologists on Fine-tuning and the Multiverse: A Preview 
